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From “May Contain” to “Does Contain”:  
The price and trade effects of strict information requirements for GM maize under the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
 




Article 18.2.a of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety requires that each traded shipment 
of living modified organisms intended for food, feed or processing (LMO-FFPs)- essentially 
unprocessed genetically modified (GM) products- be labeled as such. More specifically, in 2006, 
Protocol members decided on a two-option rule. Shipments containing well identified LMO-
FFPs would be labeled as “does contain” LMO-FFPs and would include a list of all GM events 
present in each shipment. Shipments containing LMO-FFPs that are not well-identified would be 
labeled as “may contain” LMO-FFPs as done previously. Members would also post a complete 
list of GM events approved on an internet database.  
This  paper  provides  a  comprehensive  trade  assessment  of  strict  documentation 
requirements on traded shipments globally. More specifically we evaluate the trade diversion, 
price, and welfare effects of implementing the “does contain” rule on the maize sector in all 
significant  trading  countries.  Using  a  new  spatial  trade  equilibrium  model,  we  implement 
scenarios by adding differential transport costs only between GM producers and CPB members.  
Our results show that information requirements would have a significant effect on the 
world market for maize. But they would have even greater effects on trade, creating significant 
trade distortion, diverting exports from their original destination. The measure would also lead to 
significant  negative  welfare  effects,  for  all  members  of  the  Protocol  and  non-member  that 
produce GM maize. While producers in non-GM Protocol member countries may benefit from 
increased protection, consumers and producers in selected countries of Sub-Saharan Africa will 
have  to  proportionally  pay  a  much  heftier  price  for  such  measure.  This  results  call  for 
governments in African and other affected Protocol member countries to reconsider their support 
for this new regulation that is bound to have no environmental benefits but significant and lasting 
economic costs.  




1.  Introduction 
The  Cartagena  Protocol  on  Biosafety  (CPB),  a  supplementary  agreement  to  the  United  Nations 
Convention on Biological Diversity introduced in 2000 (Convention on Biodiversity 2000), that entered 
into force in September 2003 with the goal of setting up a harmonized framework of risk assessment, risk 
management and information sharing on the transboundary movements of Living Modified Organisms 
(LMOs).
1 Among the key measures of the Protocol, there are specific rules for LMOs intended for direct 
uses as food, feed or processing (noted LMO -FFPs), which are essentially unprocessed   genetically 
modified (GM) agricultural commodities.
2  
In particular, Article 18.2.a of the Protocol requires that each traded shipment of LMO-FFPs be 
labeled as “may contain” LMO-FFPs not intended for release in the environment, though it also noted that 
a more specific rule on information requirements should be determined at a later date (Convention on 
Biodiversity 2000). At a March 2006 meeting in Brazil, after a very contentious debate on this issue, 
Protocol members agreed to adopt a two-option rule consisting of a more stringent option and the less 
stringent one that had previously been in effect (BRIDGES 2006). Under the stringent option, shipments 
containing  LMO-FFPs  identified  through  means  such  as  identity-preservation (IP)  systems  would  be 
labeled as “does contain” LMO-FFPs and would include a list of all GM events present in each shipment. 
Shipments containing LMO-FFPs that are not well-identified would follow previous practice and would 
be labeled as “may contain” LMO-FFPs. At the same time, a complete list of GM events commercialized 
in the exporting country would be available to importers via the Biosafety Clearing House (BCH), an 
internet database. At the same meeting, Protocol members also agreed that the two-option rule would be 
reconsidered in 2010, with the possibility of making the stringent “does contain” option mandatory for all 
countries in 2012 (BRIDGES 2006).  
While  the  benefits  of  this  proposed  change  are  highly  debatable,  its  implementation  would 
generate significant new costs (e.g., Kalaitzandonakes 2005, Redick 2007). More specifically, under the 
“does contain” rule, countries that only produce and export non-GM products would be exempt from 
verifications and tests, while countries that export GM would have to test each shipment to verify the 
accuracy of GM-event identification. Importers that are ratifying parties of the CPB would also need to 
pay for the IP system or to conduct tests to confirm the validity of shipment statements in order to ensure 
enforcement of mandatory information requirements.  
                                                           
1 - Also called genetically modified organisms.   
2 These products represent more than half of total import values of the four main GM commodities. Approximately 
51% of soybeans and 88% of maize import value comes from unprocessed commodities (Gruere 2006).  
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Previous studies have analyzed the likely economic implications of adopting the “does contain” 
rule in different countries, such as Argentina (Direccion Nacional de Mercados Agroalimentarios 2004), 
the United States (Kalaitzandonakes 2004) or Australia (Foster and Galeano 2006), reporting that the 
costs of such change would be potentially significant. More recently, Huang et al. (2008) show that the 
cost of implementation would be large globally, but not really significant for China (their focus country). 
Gruere and Rosegrant (2008) assess the potential implementation costs of article 18.2.a on all countries 
member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC),
3 and provide a range of cost estimates for 
exporters and importers, noting th e disproportional cost for less develop ed  countries that have been 
supportive of this measure. They also show that it would effectively constitute a new entry cost for GM 
adoption and for Protocol membership in this region.  
Yet most of these studies provide short-run, partial cost estimates of the strict rule in particular 
regions, leaving aside potential price and trade diversion effects. Huang et al. (2008) do use a multi -
region computable general equilibrium model to assess the potential trade effects o f this new measure, 
showing that it would affect the prices of maize and soybeans. But their approach focuses only on a few 
regions (China, the Americas and the world), uses aggregate sectors from the GTAP database, and does 
not provide a detailed assessment of potential long run trade diversions. While their results show that the 
cost of implementation would be large for all, but not really significant for China, they note that other 
developing countries would likely pay a higher price.  
The objective of this paper is to complement previous studies by providing a comprehensive 
global trade assessment of strict documentation requirements in all countries members of the Protocol. In 
particular, our analysis intends to evaluate the  market  effect it would have  on developing countries 
member of the Protocol. To do so, we developed a spatial trade model and simulate scenarios to evaluate 
the trade diversion, price, and welfare effects of implementing the “does contain” rule on the maize sector 
in all significant trading countries, using data from multiple sources in the reference period 1995-2005. 
This includes transportation costs; allow a lower level of product analysis (HS-4 digit) and the inclusion 
of more countries than GTAP-based models, and accounts for trade diversion and the creation of new 
trade flows. 
The results of our policy simulation intend to provide an overview of the medium to long run 
effects of mandating the “does contain” rule to all members of the Protocol, ahead of the CPB negotiation 
in Japan in October 2010. Developing countries members of the CPB have been vocal supporters of using 
precautionary  measures  for  trade  of  GM  commodities,  such  as  Article  18.2.a,  but  they  may  have 
                                                           
3 APEC is a regional trade body covering 21 countries located around the Pacific Ocean, from Chile to New 
Zealand, including large traders like Mexico, the United States, Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and 
Australia. 5 
 
underestimated  the  cost  of  such  measure  on  their  economies.  Beyond  the  cost  estimates,  and  their 
geographic and product differentiation, our findings aim at giving an outlook of a possible future trade 
scenario for GM commodities in the presence of increasingly stricter trade regulatory measures in specific 
trade blocks.  
In  the  following  section  we  provide  a  conceptual  framework  for  analysis.  We  then  present  the 
simulation model, data, and policy scenarios. The fourth section presents and discusses the first results of 
our simulations, and we close the paper with some policy conclusions. 
2.  Conceptual framework 
While the “may contain” and “does contain” rules may share usefulness for regulatory purposes, their 
costs of implementation widely differ. Under the “does contain” rule, countries that export GM would 
have to test each shipment to verify the accuracy of the list of GM-events, whereas the “may contain” 
would not require additional test beyond those to reject unapproved events in the importing countries. 
Even if all GM events are approved in all importing nations, the exporter will be required to provide 
precise  information  on  each  shipment.  This  may  also  include  additional  insurance  cost  for  shippers 
against the rejection of shipments On the importing side, CPB member countries will need to pay for the 
IP  system  or  to  conduct  tests  to  confirm  the  validity  of  shipment  statements  in  order  to  ensure 
enforcement of these requirements. Naturally importers will also have to pay the price for the information 
given the additional testing and insurance applied to shipments.  
   Given these general considerations, we propose an analytical framework based on the 
characterization of Gruere and Rosegrant (2008) that categorize countries to assess the cost of 
information requirements. More specifically, we divide countries into four groups according to their 
membership to the CPB and whether they produce GM maize. In particular:  
  Group 1 countries produce GM maize but are not members of the CPB (e.g., Argentina) 
  Group 2 countries do not produce GM maize but are members of the CPB (e.g. Japan, Mexico) 
  Group 3 countries produce GM maize and are members of the CPB (e.g., Brazil, South Africa) 
  Group 4 countries do not produce GM maize and are not members of the CPB (e.g. Russia) 
This categorization is used to impose the effect of strict information on specific trade flows, i.e., those 
linking the groups of GM maize producing countries to groups of CPB members. Figure 1 shows the 





Figure 1. Affected and non affected trade flows. 
 
Source: Gruere and Rosegrant (2008). 
Two types of trade relationships are  bound to be affected, those that will request testing at the 
import and export sides (dashed arrows in Figure 1), linking GM producers to CPB members, and those 
that would affect only exporters, linking CPB GM producing countries to non-CPB member countries 
(dotted arrows in Figure 1). 
We  use  this  framework  to  set  up  a  simplified  partial  equilibrium  model  of  trade  with  four 
countries (A, B, C, and D) representatives of the four groups, to illustrate the potential price effect of such 
regulation. Each country I  faces a linear supply S
I defined by the inverse relationship:  , whose 
slope coefficient depends on whether the country adopts GM (k = g) or not (k = n). We assume that the 
slope coefficients are ranked as follows:  , and that A and C are net exporters, 
while the two others are net importers. The demand in each country is linear and defined by the inverse 
demand equations:  . The equilibrium price is reached when all excess supply 
equals excess demand. The original price of the world ( ) is:  
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The proposed regulation is modeled as an additional transport cost for GM and non-GM for A to B and 
C,
4 and from C to B, for simplification. Let us assume a per unit cost τ, applied as a relative tariff on the 
affected trade flows. At the equilibrium, there are two prices for commingled commodities: one with 
affected flows and the other with non-affected. The affected equilibrium is going to be defined by the 
relationship between A and B and C, while the other will be affected by the relationships A and D. 
Naturally A and C will only export to B and D under price arbitrage conditions.  










In this simplified case, the cost of the regulation acts as a wedge between the two prices- the higher 
the cost, the larger the difference between the two. The international price may or may not differ, but the 
local consumer price will increase in B and C, and may decrease in A and D. Therefore consumers in A 
and D may experience welfare gain, but because of the tariff like effect, producers of A, C and potentially 
D will lose, while producers in B will gain. These changes will occur in the short to medium term, in the 
long term, countries may decide to produce or abandon GM, while others may decide to join or abandon 
                                                           
4 The basic transport costs are not included explicitly here, because we focus on the new costs associated with the 
regulation, but they are treated with care in the empirical application. 8 
 
the CPB. If the effect on price is significant, A producers may try to avoid planting new GM crops, to 
lower additional losses. 
Naturally  the  use  of  this  aggregate  trade  model  can  only  provide  a  crude,  medium  term,  and 
inaccurate  appreciation  of  what  information  requirements  will  do.  Not  all  GM  producers  are  large 
exporters, not all importers are the same, and transport costs, tariffs, and the structure of supply and 
demand vary largely from one country to another, even within the same group. We will now turn to our 
simulation model to explore the observable effects of the strict option under specific scenarios in the case 
of GM maize. 
 
3.  Model and scenarios 
We built a spatial trade equilibrium model (Samuelson 1952, Takayama and Judge 1971)  of the 
international market for maize, which includes 80 countries that produce, export, and/or import maize. All 
countries are maximizing their welfare function subject to a set of spatial trade arbitration equations. The 
structure of the model is based on the application by Devadoss et al. (2005) in the case of trade of timber 
(with fewer regions). The objective function is a quasi welfare function (QW), that Devadoss et al. (2005) 
call a net social monetary gain function, defined as: 
                        (1) 
Where ʱi, βi, γi, and ʴi are the positive demand and supply coefficients, respectively, yi is the quantity 
demanded, and xi the quantity produced in country i, tij is the transportation cost from i to j and xij is the 
volume exported from i to j,    and   are the market supply and demand prices for maize (which 
accounts  for  constraints  in  and  access  to  the  international  market),  and    is  the  ad  valorem  tariff 
equivalent for an import of maize from i to j. The market prices should not be confused with the country 
prices    that  are  defined  by  the  inverse  demand  and  supply  equations    and 
.  This  objective  function  is  maximized  subject  to  the  following  set  of  feasibility 
constraints, capacity constraints and arbitrage conditions: 
  






The two first constraints imply that the total quantity exported does not exceed the production and 
that the total quantity imported is greater or equal than the demand. The third and fourth conditions state 
that the market demand price should not exceed the country demand price and that the market supply 
price should be greater than or equal to the country supply price. When these inequalities are binding, in 
the  case  of  an  interior  solution,  market  and  country  prices  are  equal,  and  the  country  produces  or 
consumes a nonzero quantity of maize. The fifth constraint relates the market supply price (accounting for 
transport costs and tariffs) to the market demand price, and the last condition is that demand, supply and 
trade are nonnegative. 
Table 1. List of exporting and importing countries included in the model and their respective groups 
  Countries and groups 
Net exporters  Argentina (1), Austria (2), Bulgaria (2), Brazil (3), China (2), Czech Republic (3), France (2), 
Hungary (2), India (2), Moldova (4), Namibia (2), Paraguay (2), Romania (2), South Africa 
(3), Swaziland (2), Thailand (2), Uganda (2), Ukraine (2), USA (1) 
Net importers  Algeria (2), Angola (4), Bangladesh (2), Belgium-Luxemburg (2), Bolivia (2), Canada (1), 
Chile (4), Colombia (2), Costa Rica (2), Croatia (2), Cuba (2), Cyprus (2), Ecuador (2), Egypt 
(2), El Salvador (2), Germany (3), Greece (2), Guatemala (2), Honduras (2), Indonesia (2), Iran 
(2), Israel (4), Italy (2), Jamaica (4),  Japan (2), Jordan (2), Kenya (2), Kuwait (4), Lebanon 
(2), Lybia (2), Malawi (4), Malaysia (2), Mauritius (2), Mexico (2), Morocco (4), Mozambique 
(2),  Nigeria  (2),  Netherlands  (2),  North  Korea  (2),  Pakistan  (4),  Panama  (2),  Peru  (2), 
Philippines (3), Russia (4), Saudi Arabia (2), Slovenia (2), South Korea (2), Spain (3), Sri 
Lanka  (2),  Sudan  (2),  Syria  (2),  Tanzania  (2),  Turkey  (2),  Uruguay  (1),  Venezuela  (2), 
Vietnam (2), Yemen (2), Zambia (2), Zimbabwe (2) 
Source:  authors.  The  groups  are  based  on  the  year  2009  for  protocol  membership  and  2008  for  GM  maize 
production (James, 2009).  
Table 1 shows the list of countries retained for the simulation, that includes all countries with maize 
production, export and/or import volumes during 1995-2005 exceeded 0.1% of total volume and for 
which key data was available. Because spatial trade models only allow for unidirectional bilateral trade 
flow, we distinguish net exporters from net importers based on United Nations COMTRADE data at the 
HS 4 digit level (1205) from 1995-2005.  
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Table 2. Data sources for key parameters. 
Parameters  Years  Sources of original data 
Production  1995-2005  FAOSTAT, UN Food and Agricultural Organization 
Domestic Prices  1995-2005  FAOSTAT, UN Food and Agricultural Organization 
Consumer prices  1995-2003  FAOSTAT, UN Food and Agricultural Organization 
Elasticities of supply   2001-2005  IMPACT model, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Elasticities of demand  2001-2005  IMPACT model, International Food Policy Research Institute 
Net trade flows  1995-2005  UN COMTRADE 1005 (HS-4) bilateral trade data.  
Transportation costs  2004-2006  Ocean freight rates from the International Grains Council.  
Ad-valorem tariffs  2005  MAcMap database.  
Source: authors. 
Table 2 summarizes the major sources of data used for parameterization. As noted above, we assume 
linear supply and demand in each country, with initial coefficients based on production data from the 
Food and Agricultural Organization FAOSTAT database, and supply and demand elasticities from the 
IMPACT  model  of  the  International  Food  Policy  Research  Institute.  Transportation  costs  for  each 
bilateral trade flow are estimated using report ocean freight rates from the International Grains Council as 
references and distances between ports computed with data from the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et 
d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). Tariff rates are based on MAcMap HS-6 database of ad valorem 
equivalent aggregate tariff developed by the CEPII and the International Trade Centre (ITC). Producer 
and consumer prices are derived from above listed data and consumer and producer support equivalents 
from IMPACT and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
5  
Because of the inconsistency across data  sources (Table 2), and incomplete datasets for some of the 
parameters, we use cross -entropy methods to calibrate th e models, following a procedure used by 
Robinson et al. (2001) and You and Wood (2006). More specifically, the parameterization is completed in 
two stages. In the first stage, bilateral trade data are entered and rebalanced to fit with the rest of the data. 
In the second stage, transport costs are being adjusted to fit with the rest of the data. In these two stages, 
the prior distributions of probabilities for the parameters of interest (bilateral trade flows and transport 
costs) are  based on  distributions of frequencies of trade volume per exporter and of transport costs 
directly  derived from available data.  The support used for these cross ent ropy stages is therefore a 
uniform distribution. The third stage runs the model of quasi-welfare maximization in a standard fashion 
using a non linear solver in GAMS.   
                                                           
5 The complete procedures, while not presented here, are available from the authors. 
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Table 3. Definition of scenarios 
  Affected trade flows  Additional cost imposed on trade flows 
Base  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3 
Set A  1→2, 1→3, 2→2, 2→3  0  $1.5/ton  $6.5/ton  $13/ton 
Set B  1→2, 1→3, 2→2, 2→3  0  $1.5/ton  $6.5/ton  $13/ton 
3→1, 3→4  0  $1/ton  $5/ton  $9/ton 
Source: Authors, based on Gruere and Rosegrant (2008). 
We run six scenarios of simulations by implementing marginal increase in transport costs of affected 
trade flows of potentially GM maize. Table 3 presents each of the scenarios. Set A imposes additional 
transport costs only on flows between GM producers and CPB members. Set B includes the same chocks 
but also include additional costs for exports from GM producing countries that are CPB members (Group 
3)  toward  any  non-CPB  members.  In  other  words,  set  A  provides  a  minimum  (or  pragmatic) 
implementation of the requirements by CPB members, and set B shows the situation if CPB members 
implement it to all their exports as long as they produce GM crops.  
Under each set, the Base scenario represents the initial situation, which can be interpreted as 
the “may contain” option. Scenario 1 introduces a small per volume cost on affected trade flows 
(see Figure 1), based on a sum of the export and import costs assumed by Gruere and Rosegrant 
(2008), but that are also consistent with the costs estimated by Huang et al. (2008) in the case of 
China. Scenarios 2 and 3 impose higher additional costs, following Gruere and Rosegrant (2008), 
citing JRG Consulting (2004) and Kalaitzandonakes (2005), that represent less efficient testing 
systems,
6 and that may be more representative of the costs for less developed trading countries.  
In each case, we focus on three key variables: the relative changes in trade volume , prices 





                                                           
6 JRG Consulting (2004) and Kalaitzandonakes (2005) study the cases of major exporters of GM products, with very 
advanced infrastructure, and therefore their proposed cost may still be small compared to the actual transport costs 
for smaller developing countries. But because they are much higher than those of Huang et al. (2008), that appear to 
be more precise, we take them as benchmark value for possible high cost of implementation.  12 
 
4.  First results 
a.  Set A 
-  Changes in main market variables 
Table 4. Relative changes in world market variables compared to the Base 






Aggregate quantity  -0.04%  -0.16%  -0.32% 
Average p
S  +0.2%  +0.8%  +1.6% 
Average p
D  +0.0%  +1.2%  +2.4% 
Quasiwelfare  -8.6%  -37%  -77% 
Source: derived from simulation results. 
At the global level, the additional transport cost implemented on the main affected trade flows 
decreases the total production of maize by 600,000 (scenario A1) to 1.6 million ton (A3). As expected, an 
increase in the cost of information requirements amplifies the effects it has on the world market. The 
average country supply price increases by 0.2 to 1.6% in scenario A3. The average country demand price 
also increases, signifying a drop in demand, by up to 2% in scenario A3. The aggregate quasi-welfare 
does  decrease  significantly  with  increased  additional  costs  as  net  monetary  gains  decline  by  a  large 
relative  amount  but  a  lower  absolute  value  (from  -14  to  -25)  with  lower  supply  and  demand  and 
additional transport costs. 
However these results do not provide a good overview of the changes experienced at a lower 
level of aggregation. Since the shocks are implemented by group, it is useful to first analyze differences in 
groups, as shown in Table 5. 
Table 5. Relative changes (%) in key variables compared to the base in each group of countries 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
Scenario  A1  A2  A3  A1  A2  A3  A1  A2  A3  A1  A2  A3 
Supply  -0.1  -0.6  -1.1  +0.1  +0.3  +0.6  -0.1  -0.4  -0.9  +0.0  +0.2  +0.4 
Demand  +0.2  +1.0  +2.0  -0.2  -0.8  -1.5  -0.3  -1.3  -2.6  -0.0  -0.1  -0.1 
Average p
S  -0.4  -2.0  -3.9  +0.3  +1.4  +2.7  -0.3  -1.3  -2.9  +0.0  +0.1  +0.2 
Average p
D  -0.3  -1.5  -3.0  +0.3  +1.6  +3.2  +0.4  +1.9  +3.6  -0.0  -0.2  -0.7 
Source: Derived from simulation results. 
  Group 1, whose exports are affected does experience a decrease in supply and supply prices. 
Production  declines  by  about  2.9  million  tons,  a  non-negligible  amount.  Most  of  this  decline  is 
experienced by the United States (-2.6 million tons), but all Group 1 countries do reduce their production. 
With the average demand price decreasing by 0.3 to 3%, internal demand does increase by about 4.4 
million tons, which have to come from a reduction of exports or an increase in imports.  
Results for Group 2 are opposite in direction and amplitude. Countries in this group slightly increase 
their  production  of  maize  (by  190,000  to  1.6  million  tons),  due  to  the  effect  of  the  new  tariff  like 
measures, but decrease their demand because of an increase in the demand prices. This region is the 13 
 
largest consumer of maize, and a 1.5% decline in maize demand (scenario A3) translates into a reduction 
of consumption by about 4.6 million tons. This suggests that the region does import more maize that it 
increases its exports overall. However, the group includes a large number of countries that do not all share 
the same trend. Mexico, India, Indonesia, Italy, France and Nigeria experience large decrease in demand 
(exceeding 250,000 tons), but Mexico is the only country with a drop exceeding 1 million tons. China and 
Japan do not experience any change in demand or supply.  On the supply side, France, Mexico, Nigeria 
and Italy lead the group in production increase (ranging from 100,000 to 200,000 tons in scenario A3). 
These suggest both significant domestic changes towards exports outside the region.  
Group 3 countries experience an intermediate situation, with decreased supply and demand, with a 
higher demand price and a reduction in the supply price. But the drop in demand (from 200,000 in 
scenario A1 to 1.8 million tons in scenario A3) largely exceeds the decrease in supply (-81,000 to -
702,000), signifying a growing maize surplus. Most of the decline in demand is borne by Brazil (-1 
million tons in A3), South Africa (-300,000 tons) and Spain (-200,000 tons). The decrease supply is also 
experienced most largely by Brazil (- 375000 tons in A3) and to a smaller extent, South Africa (-140,000 
tons), but much less by other countries in the group. The main maize producers in this Group may 
therefore experience consumer losses but producers gains with new exports outside of the region.  
Lastly,  Group  4  has  a  distinct  pattern  with  on  average,  negligible  changes  in  supply  demand, 
following the same pattern as Group 2. However the minor observed decrease in demand is associated 
with a minor decrease in demand price, suggesting the presence of heterogeneous effects in countries with 
differentiated  demand  elasticities.  Indeed,  unlike  in  other  groups,  there  is  a  significant  variation  of 
demand effects within Group 4. Some countries, like Moldavia, Israel and to a larger extent Malawi (-
100,000 tons in A3), experience lower demand, while other larger countries, like Pakistan, Russia and 
Chile  increase  their  demand  for  maize.  These  variations  mimic  the  demand  price  fluctuation  across 
countries.  Significant  variations  are  also  observable  on  the  supply  side,  with  Moldova  and  Malawi 
producing more maize (up to +58,000 tons) to take advantage of higher supply prices, while Chile and 
Bosnia  decrease  their  production,  and  larger  countries  do  not  change  their  production  level.  Angola 
slightly increases its production under scenario A1 and decreases it under the two other scenarios.  
-  Trade effects 
The  simulation  results  on  trade  are  generally  consistent  with  our  expectations;  trade  flows  with 
additional  costs  are  affected.  But  the  magnitude  of  trade  diversion  is  perhaps  more  significant  than 
expected and varies across regions and scenarios. Table 6 shows a decomposition of trade by groups 
under the three scenarios. Figures 2, 3, and 4 illustrate these changes.  14 
 
Table 6. Change in trade volume relative to the Base under the three scenarios (highlighted 
cells represent affected trade flows) 
Scenario 
Origin\Destination  To Group 1  To Group 2  To Group 3  To Group 4 
Total 
exports 
A1  From Group 1  1885156  -3317062  -394530  845115.9  -981319.7 
From Group 2  -2680557  4829371  355383.2  -2390560  113636.84 
From Group 3  1412203  -2853939  -3059.76  1534353  89557.269 
From Group 4  -728304  732137.5  25.18012  0  3858.9336 
Total imports  -111502  -609492  -42181.4  -11091.3  -774266.7 
 




From Group 1  152547.8  -4137491  -761814  504045.6  -4242712 
From Group 2  -2680557  5065918  587044.6  -2930275  42130.082 
From Group 3  2771135  -4772298  -8214.7  2400019  390642.57 
From Group 4  -728304  745408.6  -346.341  0  16758.505 
  Total imports  -485178  -3098462  -183331  -26209.6  -3793181 
 




From Group 1  -119571  -9915063  -893923  2561052  -8367504 
From Group 2  -2680557  5951708  350953.4  -3020496  601608.16 
From Group 3  2478937  -2098506  25908.67  418164.8  824504.51 
From Group 4  -728304  553884.3  208551.8  0  34132.283 
  Total imports  -1049495  -5507977  -308509  -41278.6  -6907259 
Source: Results from simulation. 
 
Figure 2. Changes in trade volume (tons) relative to the Base under Scenario A1 
 
Source: Results from simulation. 
 
Figure 3. Changes in trade volume (tons) relative to the Base under Scenario A2
 





















Figure 4. Changes in trade volume (tons) relative to the Base under Scenario A3 
 
Source: Results from simulation 
 
In Scenario A1, an additional transport cost is imposed on trade flows going from Group 1 and Group 
3 to Group 2 and 3 (Table 3). As shown in the shaded cells, these trade flows are largely reduced because 
of the additional transport cost. In particular, Group 1 and 3 export around 6 million tons less toward 
Group 2 and 400,000 tons less toward Group 3 than in the Base scenario. But these deficits are partially 
compensated by exports from other groups; Groups 2 and 4 export 5.6 million and 355,000 additional 
tons to Group 2 and 3, respectively. A domino effect follows, with countries in affected groups (1 and 3) 
diverting their exports towards non-affected regions (1 and 4) and countries in compensating groups (2 
and 4) reducing their exports towards affected exporters (1 and 3).  Still, in aggregate the total trade 
volume is reduced by 700,000 tons, and all groups import less maize than before. But Group 1 is the only 
one to reduce its total exports because of the additional cost. In consistency with above observations, 
Group 2 and 3 do in fact export larger amounts than in the Base scenario.  
The same general effects are observed at a larger scale under scenarios 2 and 3. Overall, the total 
trade  volume  decreases  by  an  additional  3  million  and  6.2  million  tons  in  scenarios  A2  and  A3, 
respectively. Results from Scenario A2 are fully consistent with the ones presented in A1, at a larger 
scale. Results from Scenario A3, however, do deviate minimally; instead of diminishing, exports from 
Group 3 to Group 3 increase slightly by a non-significant amount (+26,000 tons, which is equivalent to 
one small cargo). This may be due to the fact that exports to Group 2 are so much diminished (-12 million 
tons from Group 1 and 3), that compensating groups (2 and 4) send an even larger volume to this group 
than to Group 3, creating an excess demand in Group 3 that may be met by minimal additional amounts 
from exporters in 3.  
  At the country level, the largest changes are experienced by major trading countries in Group 1 
and 3, as expected. For instance in scenario A1, the United States decrease its exports by about 800,000 
tons overall, but it decreases its exports to Turkey (group 2) and the Philippines (group 3) by 820,000 and 
165,000 tons, respectively. In the same scenario Brazil (Group 3) exports more overall, but 1.2 million 
tons less to Italy (Group 2), that is compensated by an increase in exports of 1.8 million tons to Canada 
(Group 1). South Africa (Group 3) also decreases its exports to various Group 2 countries by 1.2 million 











b.  Set B 
-Change in main market variables 
Table 7 shows the relative changes in prices, quantities and quasiwelfare at the global level. These 
results are almost identical to the ones under set A when comparing the three scenarios (Table 4). In 
particular,  the  volume  of  production,  and  average  of  supply  and  demand  prices  experience identical 
relative  changes. The  estimated  changes  in  quasiwelfare  are almost  identical,  with  only  scenario  B3 
leading to a very minimal decline compared to scenario A3. This may indicate that the additional changes 
have only minor effects on the market, given that they do not represent major trade flows. 
Table 7. Relative changes in world market variables compared to the Base  






Aggregate quantity  -0.04%  -0.16%  -0.32% 
Average p
S  +0.2%  +0.8%  +1.6% 
Average p
D  +0.3%  +1.2%  +2.4% 
Quasiwelfare  -8.6%  -37%  -78% 
Source: Results from simulations 
Table 8. Relative changes (%) in key variables compared to the base in each group of countries 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4 
Scenario  B1  B2  B3  B1  B2  B3  B1  B2  B3  B1  B2  B3 
Supply  -0.1  -0.6  -1.1  +0.1  +0.3  +0.6  -0.1  -0.5  -0.9  +0.1  +0.2  +0.4 
Demand  +0.2  +1.0  +2.0  -0.2  -0.8  -1.2  -0.3  -1.3  -2.6  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2 
Average p
S  -0.4  -2.0  -3.9  +0.3  +1.3  +2.7  -0.3  -1.3  -2.9  +0.1  +0.1  +0.2 
Average p
D  -0.3  -1.6  -3.0  +0.4  +1.6  +3.2  +0.4  +1.9  +3.6  +0.0  -0.2  -0.6 
Source: Results from simulations. 
Table 8 presents the same relative changes by Group.  Once again, the results are extremely similar to 
the ones obtained under set A, both in terms of signs and quantitative relative changes from the Base. A 
few changes appear for selected scenarios and variables, but never exceeding +/- 0.1%. The only visible 
difference concerns Group 4. This group, a relatively lower trader of maize than others, experiences 
additional costs for its imports from CPB members (countries of Group 3) compared to set A. This 
results in non-zero effect of B1 and slightly different effects on the demand side under scenario B3, 
compared to A3- the demand price decreases a little less, and the demand decreases a little more. While 
Group 1 also witnesses the same changes for imports from CPB members, the effects of additional 
transport costs are negligible, because it is constituted of mostly net exporting regions, or regions that 
may compensate their losses.  
-Trade effects 
The trade effects of the shocks implemented under scenarios B1, B2, and B3 are presented in Table 9 and 
Figures 5, 6, and 7, in the same fashion as for set A. Naturally two more cells are shaded under each  17 
 
Table 9. Change in trade volume relative to the Base under the three scenarios (highlighted 
cells represent affected trade flows) 
Scenario 
Origin\Destination  To Group 1  To Group 2  To Group 3  To Group 4 
Total 
exports 
B1  From Group 1  3951520  -8312947  -644972  4021576  -984824 
From Group 2  -2680557  5047996.1  136315.8  -2390470  113284.8 
From Group 3  -653435  2391414.2  689.6625  -1650040  88629.4 
From Group 4  -728304  266166.43  465983.1  0  3845.724 
Total imports  -110776  -607370.7  -41984  -18933.9  -779064 
 




From Group 1  3577957  -11483886  -885787  4544955  -4246762 
From Group 2  -2680557  5401785.2  250647.6  -2930188  41687.3 
From Group 3  -653435  2667651.3  25393.43  -1650040  389570.3 
From Group 4  -728304  318403.31  426643.7  0  16743.24 
  Total imports  -484339  -3096047  -183103  -35272.9  -3798761 
 




From Group 1  3059161  -14155187  -1849733  4618595  -8327164 
From Group 2  -2680557  5343064.3  1093854  -3020425  735936.2 
From Group 3  -653435  3071940.9  54717.8  -1650040  823184.2 
From Group 4  -728304  369549  392868.3  0  34113.49 
  Total imports  -1003135  -5370633  -308293  -51869.4  -6733930 
Source: Results from simulations. 
 
Figure 5. Changes in trade volume (tons) relative to the Base under Scenario B1 
 


























Figure 7. Changes in trade volume (tons) relative to the Base under Scenario B3 
 
scenario in Table 9 to indicate the two new trade flows being affected by information requirements.  At 
first view, the aggregate results of Table 9 appear similar to those observed in Table 6 (set A). Total trade 
volume  is  reduced  by  770,000  tons  under  B1,  3.2 million  tons  under  B2  and  6.7  million  under  B3 
(slightly less than for A3). All groups reduce their imports and only Group 1 reduces its exports. But in 
the detail, the amplitude and direction of intra and inter group trade change largely, as visible on the three 
Figures below Table 9.  
  Group 1 countries do follow the same pattern as under set A, they export much less towards 
Group 2 and 3, and compensate by exporting more toward Group 1 and 4. But the magnitude of these 
diversions is much larger than under set A. In particular, Group 1 reduces its exports to Group 2 by 8 to 
14 million tons depending on the scenario, instead of 3 to 10 million tons under set A. Under scenario B3, 
Group 1 reduces its exports to Group 3 by 1.8million tons, or double that in scenario A3. Interestingly, 
these changes happen despite the fact that Group 1 is not directly affected by the new transport costs. The 
effect is indirect and seen when observing the trade changes in other groups. 
  Group 2 also follows the same diversion scheme as under set A, diverting its exports to Group 2 
and 3 to compensate for the loss due to Group 1’s trade reductions. Its overall imports and exports are 
very similar to those under set A. On the import side however, Group 2 experience a much larger shift in 
maize  suppliers,  notably  because  of  the  much  larger  drop  in  exports  from  Group  1.  But  instead  of 
obtaining volume from itself and Group 4 (Set A), it receives a large amount of maize (2.4 to 3.1 million 
tons) from Group 3. 
  Group 3 is in fact the most affected by these additional changes, as expected. It faces additional 
costs for all its maize exports, regardless of their destination, but with more costs imposed on trade to 
Group 2 and itself than for Group 1 and 4.  Interestingly, however, these relative smaller changes on 
exports to Group 1 and 4 lead to a complete switch in export diversion from Group 3. Group 3 reduces its 
exports to Group 1 and 4, and increases significantly its export to Group 2 and to a lesser extent Group 3. 
This may be due to different market considerations, but likely mostly to trade preference factors, such as 
regular tariffs and transport costs, as well as Group 3 exporters’ own  competitiveness compared to that of 













preference for exporting to Group 2, which has the largest set of importers. Despite these significant 
changes, the aggregate exports and imports under set B scenarios are virtually identical than that under set 
A scenarios. The effect is a simple and pure trade diversion. 
  Lastly, trade from and to Group 4 is relatively not affected by the new measure compared to 
scenario A. It does export more towards Group 3 than under set A, instead of devoting it to Group 2 
countries, perhaps as a compensation of the increased exports from Group 3 to Group 2. Its total imports 
do decrease more than under set A but by relatively small volumes.  
   At the country level, as under seta the largest changes can be seen in major trading nations of 
Group 1 and especially Group 3. For instance, in the case of Scenario B1, the United States (Group 1) 
reduces its exports by 360,000 tons to Saudi Arabia (Group 2), 500,000 tons to Germany (Group 3), 
600,000 tons each to Yemen, Zimbabwe and Ecuador (all Group 2), while still reducing its exports to 
Turkey (Group 2) by 1.4 million tons. These reductions are compensated by increased exports to Russia 
(Group 4, +2.6 million tons), Chile (Group 4, +800,000 tons) or Kuweit (Group 4, +600,000 tons).
7 Brazil 
decreases its exports to Canada (Group 1) by 653,000 tons,  which are compensated by an additional 
655,000 tons of exports to closer Algeria (Group 2). South Africa reduces its exports to Chile and Russia 
(Group 4) by 750,000 tons and 300,000 tons, compensating by exporting an additional 1.2 million tons 
toward closer Greece (Group 2). As expected each of this change is consistent with a cost minimizing 
effort on behalf of the exporting country; substitutions are only made to countries at similar distance or 
closer or that have similar or not significantly different trade policies.  
 
c.  Discussion: from markets to welfare effects 
The results from the simulations have shown that implementing strict information requirements 
with “Does Contain” option on maize could have significant market and especially trade effects. 
While there is less trade and less volume of maize, which constitute clear market losses, not all 
countries will experience similar welfare outcomes. In this section we look further by analyzing 
economic welfare for countries in different regions.  
  We  use  the  slope  and  intercept  coefficients  and  the  supply  and  demand  variables  to 
compute  Marshallian  consumer  and  producer  surpluses  for  each  country  and  group  in  each 
scenario.  Figures 8, 9 and 10 show the absolute changes in consumer surplus, producer surplus, 
and total surplus for each group compared to the Base. Table 11 in the appendix provides the 
results by country. 
                                                           
7 Overall the United States does decrease its exports by about 800,000 tons in this scenario. 20 
 
Figure 8. Consumer surplus (USD/year) for each group under each scenario 
 
 
Figure 9. Producer surplus (USD/year) for each group under each scenario 
 
 








































  The results show that the distribution of welfare effects is indeed quite heterogeneous. On 
the consumer side, Group 1 is bound to gain, and the other groups, especially Group 2 and 3 lose. 
These effects are amplified when moving toward more costly scenarios. On the producer side, 
Group 2 gains and Group 1 and 3 lose. The amplitude of these gains and losses also increase 
with more costly scenarios. On both side, Group 4 experience small positive changes in welfare, 
that increase with more drastic scenarios. Overall, when adding these effects, Group 4 is the only 
one that derives welfare gains that grow from A1 and B1 (+0.1% compared to the Base) to A3 
and B3 (+0.5%). Group 1 and 2 suffer significant but not large welfare losses (-0.2% and-0.1% 
respectively  under  the  more  costly  scenarios).  Group  3  does  experience  non-negligible  total 
welfare losses from $17million (-0.3% of total welfare relative to the Base) under scenarios A1 
and B1 to $134million (-2.4%) under scenarios A3 and B3.  
  These  results  suggest  that  most  countries  are  bound  to  lose  with  information 
requirements, which confirms the conclusions of other studies. But they also provide some light 
on some of the key supports toward such requirement at the Cartagena Protocol. Non-members 
only have an indirect role to play in negotiation, so even if the large trading countries in Group 1 
(like Argentina, Canada or the United States) continue to push against it, they may not advance 
much. Group 4 countries are absent from discussions, as smaller trader and non-members. The 
core of the support obviously needs to come from member countries in Group 2 and 3, that are 
both bound to lose overall, especially Group 3 countries (Brazil and Romania are the biggest 
losers,  see  Table  11).  Yet  Group  2  and  3  member  countries  (especially  Europe,  Brazil  and 
African  countries)  have  generally  been  very  supportive  of  this  measure  in  meetings  of  the 
Protocol. So why do they support a measure that could be economically detrimental for them? 
  As in other political forums, a largely well known result from the literature (Olson, 1965) 
is that well organized and smaller groups are bound to be the most influential. In developed 
countries, the most influential parties tend to be on the production side. Results presented in 
Figure 9 suggest that producers, especially in countries of Group 2 are bound to gain from this 
measure  significantly.  France  leads  a  list  of  seven  Group  4  countries  with  the  highest  total 
surplus gains (see Table 11). Given the voice of countries of agriculture producers in Europe and 
the  prominent  role  of  Europe  in  Protocol  negotiations,  directly  related  to  their  financial 
contribution to the Secretariat, these actors may play a non insignificant role in supporting the 
use of information requirements.  22 
 
In other countries of Group 2, notably in Africa, producers and consumers are typically 
not  well  represented,  and  the  support  for  such  measure  has  been  seen  from  anti-GM 
organizations, that are pushing for any restriction in the marketing of GM food. Representatives 
from African countries typically come from the Environmental ministry and have no background 
or knowledge of trade implications of Protocol measures.  
Yet these countries are bound to be directly affected by the measure, with potentially 
losses at stake. Table 10 shows the welfare results for Sub-Saharan African countries in our 
study in the case of scenario B3. Of the fourteen countries in the study, only Swaziland, Namibia 
and Angola may experience welfare gains overall, due to production gains with a small number 
of consumers in the first two countries, and the gains of consumers in a small producing country 
in the third country.  
   
Table 10. Change in welfare effects in Sub-Saharan African countries in Scenario B3 compared to the 
Base scenario 
Group  Country  Consumer surplus  Producer surplus  Total surplus 
2 
   
Kenya  -31,724,248  26,423,973  -5,300,275 
Mozambique  -14,615,990  12,510,993  -2,104,997 
Mauritius  -4,139,254  30  -4,139,224 
Namibia  -265,445  13,724,421  13,458,975 
Nigeria  -60,431,004  5,190,969  -55,240,034 
Senegal  -5,986,315  1,211,729  -4,774,585 
Swaziland  -840,087  14,174,405  13,334,318 
Tanzania  -31,384,073  27,024,343  -4,359,729 
Uganda  -8,192,094  20,502,256  12,310,162 
Zambia  -12,723,496  6,357,993  -6,365,503 
Zimbabwe  -21,561,995  15,221,805  -6,340,190 
3  South Africa  -65,822,828  -56,356,265  -122,179,093 
4  Angola  3,429,747  -1,944,368  1,485,379 
Malawi  -24,847,766  22,492,206  -2,355,560 
Source: derived from simulation results. 
While small producers in Sub-Saharan countries (mostly in Group 2) do not generally 
connect to the market, urban consumers do and may be affected by price increases as observed 
during the food price increase of 2008. Producers in Group 3 and 4 that are connected to the 
market will also lose. South Africa will even experience large losses both for producers and 
consumers. All these groups will probably pay a much larger proportional price than consumers 
in  developed  nations  of  Group  2  and  3  or  even  producers  in  some  of  the  most  productive 
countries of Group 3.  
 23 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper,  we  investigated  the  economic  effects  of  implementing  a  strict  information 
requirement (“Does Contain LMO-FFPs” with a list of specific GM events) under Article 18.2.a 
of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Building on previous studies, our analysis focuses on 
evaluating the medium to long term effect on prices, trade and welfare effects of implementing 
this regulation at the global level. 
Using a simple analytical model, we first show that such new regulation would create 
price  tension  with  losers  and  winners,  but  likely  to  make  many  member  and  non  member 
countries lose. We then use an empirical approach to validate our hypothesis in the case of 
maize. We find that, under relatively conservative cost assumptions, information requirements 
would have a significant effect on the world market for maize. But they would have even greater 
effects  on  trade,  creating  significant  trade  distortion,  diverting  exports  from  their  original 
destination. In particular, non-member countries that produce GM would reduce their exports to 
Protocol members, and GM producing countries that are part of the Protocol would also divert 
their exports to new destinations depending on the scenario. The measure would reduce world 
trade and production in maize, with significant welfare effects.  
At the global level, total welfare effects (consumer and producer surplus) would decline 
by up to $1.2 billion or 0.4% annually, but some countries bear a heavier price than others. 
While producers in non-GM Protocol member countries may benefit from increased protection, 
consumers and producers in selected countries of Sub-Saharan Africa will have to proportionally 
pay  a much heftier price for such measure. This  call  for  governments  in  African  and other 
affected countries to reconsider their support for this new regulation that does not present any 
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Table 11. Welfare effects (B3-Base) by country ranked in decreasing order of total surplus effects 
Country  Group  Consumer surplus  Producer surplus  Total surplus 
France  2  -62,219,713  106,112,897  43,893,184 
Hungary  2  -40,865,641  62,843,291  21,977,650 
India  2  -96,343,591  115,819,672  19,476,081 
Ukraine  2  -30,211,316  48,702,416  18,491,100 
Thailand  2  -32,277,708  47,583,287  15,305,578 
Bulgaria  2  -9,849,123  25,068,319  15,219,196 
Austria  2  -12,610,402  27,585,250  14,974,848 
Moldova  4  -9,597,471  24,077,008  14,479,537 
Russia  4  14,054,316  0  14,054,316 
Pakistan  4  13,569,463  0  13,569,463 
Namibia  2  -265,445  13,724,421  13,458,975 
Swaziland  2  -840,087  14,174,405  13,334,318 
Uganda  2  -8,192,094  20,502,256  12,310,162 
Paraguay  2  -4,641,102  16,325,266  11,684,164 
Morocco  4  6,040,976  1,211,487  7,252,462 
Jamaica  4  4,976,710  0  4,976,710 
Chile  4  9,100,478  -5,451,149  3,649,329 
Kuwait  4  3,102,900  -884  3,102,016 
Bosnia-Herzegovina  4  7,287,869  -4,640,796  2,647,073 
Angola  4  3,429,747  -1,944,368  1,485,379 
Uruguay  1  4,009,152  -2,777,581  1,231,571 
North Korea  2  0  0  0 
China  2  0  0  0 
Japan  2  0  0  0 
Peru  2  -915,919  539,985  -375,933 
Canada  1  52,277,220  -52,846,670  -569,450 
Indonesia  2  -54,934,316  54,121,374  -812,942 
Mozambique  2  -14,615,990  12,510,993  -2,104,997 
Vietnam  2  -22,632,465  20,350,015  -2,282,450 
Malawi  4  -24,847,766  22,492,206  -2,355,560 
Croatia  2  -20,939,053  18,265,160  -2,673,893 
Sri-Lanka  2  -3,998,789  239,400  -3,759,389 
Lebanon  2  -4,160,264  23,353  -4,136,911 
Mauritius  2  -4,139,254  30  -4,139,224 
Cyprus  2  -4,315,900  113  -4,315,788 
Tanzania  2  -31,384,073  27,024,343  -4,359,729 
Bangladesh  2  -5,446,980  718,003  -4,728,976 
Honduras  2  -9,193,198  4,435,530  -4,757,668 
Senegal  2  -5,986,315  1,211,729  -4,774,585 
Slovenia  2  -7,514,575  2,543,382  -4,971,193 
Sudan  2  -5,080,130  69,150  -5,010,980 
El Salvador  2  -10,684,092  5,665,558  -5,018,534 
Lybia  2  -5,125,276  12,702  -5,112,575 
Ecuador  2  -9,481,761  4,362,330  -5,119,431 
Panama  2  -5,907,887  727,862  -5,180,025 
Kenya  2  -31,724,248  26,423,973  -5,300,275 
Belgium-Luxembourg  2  -7,135,336  1,652,771  -5,482,565 
Yemen  2  -5,917,733  332,608  -5,585,125 
Italy  2  -86,068,087  80,352,014  -5,716,073 
Jordan  2  -6,005,157  139,282  -5,865,875 
Guatemala  2  -14,378,797  8,414,713  -5,964,084 26 
 
Costa Rica  2  -6,234,065  187,996  -6,046,069 
Zimbabwe  2  -21,561,995  15,221,805  -6,340,190 
Zambia  2  -12,723,496  6,357,993  -6,365,503 
South Korea  2  -6,947,095  445,230  -6,501,865 
Venezuela  2  -20,761,655  13,494,932  -7,266,723 
Syria  2  -8,125,198  0  -8,125,198 
Greece  2  -22,276,350  14,027,592  -8,248,758 
Cuba  2  -8,263,933  0  -8,263,933 
Israel  4  -8,535,312  0  -8,535,312 
Egypt  2  -54,620,170  45,700,845  -8,919,324 
Colombia  2  -21,611,781  12,626,420  -8,985,361 
Saudi Arabia  2  -9,215,326  74,850  -9,140,475 
Bolivia  2  -9,723,926  284,134  -9,439,792 
Algeria  2  -9,780,925  5,224  -9,775,701 
Netherlands  2  -11,557,941  1,401,634  -10,156,307 
Turkey  2  -26,682,745  15,438,971  -11,243,774 
Malaysia  2  -12,774,616  219,162  -12,555,454 
Czech Republic  3  -2,661,011  -11,068,228  -13,729,240 
Mexico  2  -185,123,585  170,500,125  -14,623,460 
Iran  2  -19,070,278  0  -19,070,278 
Argentina  1  27,794,277  -61,759,402  -33,965,125 
Germany  3  -29,015,099  -19,216,524  -48,231,624 
Nigeria  2  -60,431,004  5,190,969  -55,240,034 
Philippines  3  -22,684,865  -44,544,222  -67,229,088 
Spain  3  -48,570,401  -22,128,097  -70,698,498 
South Africa  3  -65,822,828  -56,356,265  -122,179,093 
USA  1  1,092,923,100  -1,225,618,271  -132,695,171 
Romania  3  -76,465,117  -60,754,990  -137,220,108 
Brazil  3  -277,352,077  -208,994,953  -486,347,029 
Source: Results from simulations. 